Dynamic properties of energy affordability measures by Heindl, Peter & Schüssler, Rudolf
Dis cus si on Paper No. 15-019
Dynamic Properties of  
Energy Affordability Measures
Peter Heindl and Rudolf Schüssler
Dis cus si on Paper No. 15-019
Dynamic Properties of  
Energy Affordability Measures
Peter Heindl and Rudolf Schüssler
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp15019.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
 Dynamic Properties of Energy Affordability Measures 
 
Peter Heindl* 
Department of Environmental and Resource Economics 
Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim (Germany) 
 
and 
 
Rudolf Schüssler** 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Bayreuth (Germany) 
 
 
- Abstract - 
Measures of affordability are applied in practice, e.g., to assess the affordability of energy 
services, water or housing. They can be interpreted as measures of deprivation in a 
specific domain of consumption. The large body of literature on affordability measure has 
little overlap with the existing literature on poverty measurement. A comprehensive 
assessment of the response of affordability measures as a result of changes in the 
distribution of income or expenditure is missing. This paper aims to fill this gap by 
providing a conceptual discussion on the ‘dynamics’ of energy affordability measures. 
Several types of measures are examined in a microsimulation framework to assess their 
dynamic properties. Our results indicate that some measures exhibit odd dynamic 
behavior. This includes measures used in practice, such as the low income/high cost 
measure and the double median of expenditure share indicator. Odd dynamic behavior is 
attributed to definitions made with respect to higher moments of the expenditure 
distribution. Definitions that rely on a percentage share of expenditure relative to income 
or an absolute or relative income poverty line fare well from a dynamic perspective.   
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1. Introduction 
Measures of affordability are applied in practice and discussed as indicators for deprivation in 
different domains of consumption. Examples include the assessment of ‘fuel poverty’ in the 
United Kingdom (UK) (Boardman, 2012; Liddell et al., 2012), affordability of water (García-
Valiñas et al., 2010; Gawel et al., 2013), and housing (Bourassa, 1996; Hancock, 1993). 
Affordability measures are a distinct form of poverty measure that focus on a specific domain 
in consumption, mostly the consumption of necessities. Many affordability measures are 
defined on the basis of disposable household income and expenditure and thereby assume the 
notion of a bivariate poverty measure. The measures often allow the assessment of a ‘poverty 
gap’ (or a weighted poverty gap) and are decomposable based on methods such as the one 
proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). 
The role of affordability measures in poverty research and their practical use for policy-
making is disputed. The practice of assessing fuel poverty in the UK based on affordability 
measures is criticized for lacking scientific foundation (Healy, 2004), and the existing 
literature on the issue seems to have little overlap with the general literature on poverty. 
Despite this criticism, poverty in certain domains of consumption (e.g. energy and housing) 
has caught the attention of policymakers and the general public. The reasons for this trend are 
the persistent and partly growing inequality in Europe and beyond (OECD, 2011) or the 
pronounced (partly temporary) increases in prices for certain goods. While affordability 
measures are not the only way to assess deprivation in a specific domain of consumption, they 
represent a (seemingly) transparent and straightforward way to inform about the problem. 
Naturally, any definition of affordability should rest upon a rigorous empirical assessment of 
deprivation in the relevant domains. Well established methods for such an assessment exist 
(Halleröd, 2006). Given a consensus on which aspects of deprivation in consumption need to 
be represented, it should be possible to define a meaningful poverty line based on a proper 
empirical foundation. Most of the literature on fuel poverty or energy poverty in developed 
countries focuses precisely on this ‘static’ aspect of affordability, raising the question of how 
to define deprivation in energy consumption.  
The surprisingly large body of literature on the issue neglects one important aspect: the 
question of how affordability measures respond to changes in underlying variables, such as 
income or expenditure. The ‘dynamic perspective’ of poverty is well developed for univariate 
aggregated poverty measures (Kakwani, 1980; Sen, 1976; Zheng, 1997). However, the 
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relevant axioms cannot be directly adapted to affordability measures due to the measures’ 
bivariate nature. It is nevertheless necessary to translate the spirit if not the letter of the 
axioms of poverty measurement to those of affordability measures to assess their fundamental 
dynamic properties. In the absence of reasonable dynamic properties, affordability measures 
would be of little use, whether in the domain of energy consumption or in any other domain.  
The aim of this paper is to establish certain conditions to emulate the role of axioms of 
aggregated poverty measures for affordability measures. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review with a strong focus on the discussion on fuel poverty or energy poverty in developed 
countries since affordability measures are applied to these domains in practice. The next 
section discusses the relevant normative requirements in a dynamic perspective. Against the 
backdrop of well-established axioms in univariate aggregate poverty measurement, two 
propositions are made of how affordability measures should behave in the dynamic 
perspective. The proposed requirements are tested with a simulation using household data on 
income and energy expenditure from Germany under consideration of several scenarios and 
different affordability measures. The two scenarios that are of primary interest examine the 
cases of a) an increase in expenditure for energy services with implicit ex-post redistribution, 
and b) increasing income inequality in society. Our results show that some affordability 
measures (including some that are applied in practice) have counter-intuitive dynamic 
properties.  
2. Methods 
2.1. Literature on Energy and Fuel Poverty Measures 
The literature on fuel poverty or energy poverty pivots around two branches of measurement 
techniques. Consensual measures take a number of variables related to household energy 
efficiency and energy affordability into account to derive a measure of energy-related 
deprivation. This approach was first applied by Healy (2004). A more recent pan-European 
study using consensual measures was presented by Snell and Thomson (2013). Consensual 
measures depict energy poverty as an interplay between low income and poor residential 
energy efficiency. That is, consensual measures take aspects of affordability into account, 
such as the ability to keep the home adequately warm or to make ends meet, along with 
aspects of energy efficiency, such as leaking roofs or damp walls. This effectively is a 
combination of both subjective (e.g. ability to keep the home warm) and objective (e.g. 
leaking roof or damp walls) indicators of energy-related deprivation.  
- 2 - 
 
The second family of measures are affordability measures. These focus on expenditure on 
energy services and disposable household income. An abundance of various definitions of 
affordability measures exist. The most well-known energy affordability measure is probably 
Brenda Boardman’s Ten Percent Rule (TPR) (1991). The TPR was long used as the official 
measure of fuel poverty in the UK (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013), and 
similar measures are used to assess affordability of water (Gawel et al., 2013). The TPR 
defines a household as fuel poor if it needs to spend ten percent or more of its disposable 
income on all energy services. The TPR is criticized for lacking scientific foundation and 
international comparability (Healy, 2004, p. 35), and several alternatives to measure energy 
poverty have been suggested. Boardman’s TPR approximated two-times median expenditure 
in earlier work by Isherwood and Hancock (1979). Further definitions of energy poverty 
based on median expenditure are discussed in the literature (Liddell et al., 2012, p. 27-29). 
Moore (2012), for example, compares the incidence of fuel poverty in the UK over time, inter 
alia by using a two times median expenditure share indicator (2M). Households are defined as 
energy poor by 2M if the expenditure share on all energy services exceeds twice the median 
expenditure share of the overall population.  
In a report commissioned in the UK by the Department of Energy and Climate Change, John 
Hills presented the Low Income/High Cost indicator (LIHC) as an alternative to the TPR. The 
LIHC defines a household as energy poor if its expenditure on all energy services is above the 
median expenditure of all households and when the household falls below the official income 
poverty line after all expenditure on energy services (Hills, 2012, 2011). As proposed in 
Moore (2012), definitions of energy poverty could also be based on a Minimum Income 
Standard (MIS). A household is defined as energy poor if disposable income after 
expenditure on all energy services falls below the minimum income standard. Minimum 
income standards or budget standards exist e.g. in Australia (Saunders, 2004, 1999) and have 
also been put forward for the UK (Bradshaw et al., 2008). In Germany, basic income under 
the social security scheme (SGBII rates) is determined by a minimum income standard that 
reflects the average expenditure on several groups of goods of low-income households. 
To the best of our knowledge, no contribution has to date been made to the literature on the 
dynamic properties of affordability measures. Moore (2012) briefly discusses the issue by 
comparing TPR and 2M in the context of fuel poverty in the UK. He concludes that “the 
current 10% of income definition can also exaggerate the impact of fuel prices. […]” (Moore, 
2012, p. 22). Moore’s statement of the exaggerated impact of price changes under TPR is 
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derived from a comparison to 2M. However, as it is unclear whether 2M has desirable 
dynamic properties, Moore’s argument is weak.  
There are well established axioms for (dynamic) measurement of income poverty. Seminal 
contributions have been made by Sen (1976) and Kakwani (1980). Foster et al. (1984) have 
made an important contribution with respect to techniques for poverty measurement. A 
comprehensive comparison of existing (income) poverty measures was presented by Zheng 
(1997). While affordability measures are usually dependent on two variables, namely 
disposable income and expenditure on a good or a group of goods, standard poverty measures 
are only dependent on income. Consequently, the widely accepted core axioms on (income) 
poverty measurement cannot necessarily be generalized to cover those of affordability 
measures or measures of energy poverty. Yet at least the considerations underlying poverty 
axioms can be transferred to the case of affordability measures.  
2.2. Dynamic Properties of Affordability Measures 
This paper examines how affordability measures behave under a variation of key parameters, 
such as income and expenditure. We focus on the case of energy poverty as a large body of 
literature referring to affordability already exists and the issue has been gaining attention 
across Europe. However, before proceeding to the simulation of these issues, some guiding 
theoretical considerations seem in order. A few well-known indicators (or their standard 
interpretations) stand in a problematic relationship with the conditions postulated as axioms in 
the literature on poverty measurement, or they violate requirements that appear as plausible as 
these axioms. It stands to reason that measures of poverty should be plausible under a 
variation of income or expenditure in a society, and the same holds true for indicators of 
energy poverty. Indicators that fail this test should be discarded or modified. Dynamic 
simulations will help identify respective shortcomings and determine whether modified 
indicators perform better. It is undisputable that poverty measures and energy poverty 
indicators should also satisfy certain ethical requirements, which can be derived from theories 
of distributive (or social) justice.1 However, we assume that ethical requirements might be 
more controversial than plausibility checks, and should be considered a second filter for 
poverty indicators after basic plausibility requirements have been met. We will therefore 
focus on the latter here. 
1See, e.g., Blackorby and Donaldson (1980), Papadopoulos and Tsakoglou (2008), Pogge (2007).  
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Which indicators will be discussed? Energy poverty is commonly understood as the non-
availability of adequate energy services, either due to a lack of access to energy or its non-
affordability. In developed OECD economies, which we focus on in this paper, physical non-
availability is rare, except as result of an inability to pay. Hence, economic reasons for energy 
poverty stand at the forefront here. Three concepts for the construction of affordability 
indicators with respect to energy services emerge from the literature. The first concept focuses 
on an appropriate cost share of energy services in the consumption budget of a household, or 
more simply put, its income. The second one looks at the appropriateness of energy 
expenditure as such. In the last concept, energy poverty, or non-affordability, is understood as 
a situation in which a household is pushed into income poverty because of its energy 
expenditure. Since these approaches differ conceptually, they can be represented by an 
‘indicator triangle’ (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Overview of concepts used in definitions of affordability measures dependent on 
income, expenditure, or the share of expenditure relative to income. 
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Affordability indicators for energy services can be characterized by their position in the 
indicator triangle. The prime example of the cost share approach is the TPR, according to 
which households that spend more than ten percent of their net income on adequate energy 
services are to be considered energy poor. Alternatively, the MIS indicator assumes that 
households are energy poor if their expenditure on adequate energy services pushes them 
below the official poverty line. A third indicator combines excessive expenditure and 
impoverishment, considering as energy poor any household that independently satisfies the 
two criteria of excessive expenditure for energy services and a cost push into poverty. This is 
the LIHC indicator’s approach (other indicators, discussed below, can also be characterized 
by their position in the indicator triangle). 
None of the indicators and interpretations of energy poverty broached so far preclude a 
transfer of standard requirements of poverty measurement to this field. Since the official 
poverty line or a modification of it figure in the MIS and LIHC indicators, the crucial three ‘I’ 
of poverty research seem applicable, providing three strands of information concerning the 
poor.2 Poverty indicators should ideally record the incidence and intensity of poverty and 
reflect the extent of inequality among the poor. The same demand can prima facie be made 
with respect to quantitative measures of energy poverty. One problem seems to arise because 
the TPR does not postulate an income limit, but the three ‘I’ can also be linked to an 
expenditure share limit. There are good reasons for this, because each ‘I’ stands for a key 
concern of social policy. We need a head count of the poor, information about the depth of 
poverty and about the extent to which some people are worse off than others in order to 
design policies that prioritize support for those who are worse off. Priority for the worse off is 
a widely accepted demand in modern social ethics, and it is therefore reasonable for such 
policies to also be sought for energy poverty. 
Does it follow that the axioms for poverty measures, which encapsulate the outlined 
requirements, should also apply to measures of energy poverty? A number of axioms for 
poverty measures have been postulated, but there is no consensus on a valid set of axioms. 
Zheng (1997) differentiates between core axioms and more peripheral or derivative ones.3 
However, the extent to which Zheng’s classification is accepted is unclear. Moreover, existing 
sets of axioms seem to not exhaust the relevant plausibility conditions for poverty 
2See Esposito and Lambert (2011), and with different terminology (no I’s) Zheng (1997, p. 124). 
3The notion of axiom currently (as is often the case in economics) refers to a condition indicators must satisfy 
rather than (as is the case in mathematics) to an independent foundational proposition, which cannot be derived 
from other foundational propositions.  
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measurement. We will add some conditions here that may be in line with the spirit of certain 
axioms but are not covered by their formulation. In this somewhat unsettled situation, an 
axiom for an axiom discussion of energy poverty indicators does not seem advisable. We will 
therefore focus instead on specific indicators of energy poverty and their failure to meet 
particular plausibility conditions. As we will demonstrate for the well-known TPR, MIS, and 
LIHC indicators, such failures occur and the respective indicators (or their interpretations) 
need to be modified or abandoned. 
TPR is closely associated with the research of Brenda Boardman. When Boardman (1991) 
conceived TPR based on 1988 data, the threshold simultaneously represented the average 
share of energy expenditure of the lowest 30 percent of incomes and double the median 
overall share of energy expenditure in the UK. These two characteristics need not coincide, 
and have in fact diverged since 1988. As an indicator of energy poverty, the TPR has 
normative import. Hence, the question arises which characteristic is better suited for 
normative interpretation. The standard claim is that the double median characteristic is that 
with normative import, because Isherwood and Hancock (1979) (purportedly) justified a 
double median threshold for excessive cost in the 1970s. Against this background, the British 
government seems to have made a mistake by establishing the TPR as an official indicator of 
energy poverty in 2001, because the double median share of household energy expenditure at 
the time no longer equaled ten percent. It follows that the TPR ought to be replaced by a 
double median share indicator.4 
In point of fact, however, the British government may have been wise to not comply with this 
suggestion. The normative reasons for a double median share indicator of energy poverty are 
very tenuous, and this indicator thus seems arbitrary. It would, for instance, be just as good to 
refer to traditional criteria of just pricing in the debate on energy poverty and energy prices. 
The threshold for excess expenditure would then be 1.5 median share rather than double the 
median share.5 However, this discussion seems moot because neither the double median share 
threshold nor a limit derived from the theory of just pricing satisfies the basic plausibility 
requirement for poverty indicators, which we call: 
Position Invariant Burdening (PIB): If the relative position of all persons in the 
distribution of income remains the same and all incomes are reduced by a positive 
amount, then the poverty measure 𝑃𝑃 should not decrease. 
4For a more detailed discussion of the TPR and its interpretations, see Schüssler (2014). 
5On just price in medieval economic thought, see Wood (2002, Chapter 6). 
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The idea behind this approach is that a decrease in a society’s real incomes should not be 
reflected in a concordant decrease of a poverty measure if the relative positions of all people 
remain constant. Otherwise, very poor societies might have smaller poverty rates than very 
rich societies with the same population and form of income distribution (i.e., same 
inequality).6 Standard relative poverty lines reflect this requirement. Reducing real incomes 
without adapting income distribution raises the poverty head count for the 60 percent median 
income poverty line. Surprisingly, however, none of the axioms of poverty measurement 
discussed by Zheng seems to require the observance of PIB. We nevertheless accept that 
requirement.     
Under this premise, a simple statistical consideration reveals a deficiency of the double 
median share indicator for energy poverty (and all related double median indicators). Shifting 
a statistical distribution to the right by a positive constant c shifts the distribution’s median 𝑀𝑀 
for the same amount to 𝑀𝑀 + 𝑐𝑐. This is also true for the shifted double median value 2𝑀𝑀 + 𝑐𝑐, 
but not for the new double median. The new double median is 2(𝑀𝑀 + 𝑐𝑐) and thus 𝑐𝑐 further to 
the right than the translated old median. Hence, less of the distribution’s probability mass is in 
the tail beyond the new double median than was beyond the original double median. If the 
distribution in question is one of energy expenditure shares and the double median share is a 
threshold of energy poverty, it follows that fewer households (or people) are energy poor than 
before. Yet the addition of a constant reflects a position invariant increase in the energy 
expenditure for all households. For a uniform distribution of incomes, this amounts to a lump-
sum increase in energy spending for all. For other distributions, the rise in expenditure will be 
positive for all but not equal in size. In any case, the double median share indicator suggests 
that a rise in energy expenditure for all, which does not affect the relative position of persons 
or the form of expenditure share distribution, will ceteris paribus lead to a reduction in energy 
poverty. This is obviously implausible. Rising real costs or shrinking real incomes for all 
should not result in lower recorded levels of poverty given that the relative positions of all 
persons remain the same. 
It might be argued that this requirement follows from the notion of Amartya Sen’s 
monotonicity axiom for poverty measures, which gives formal shape to the plausible 
6Zheng (1997, p. 139) seems to be aware of this problem in his discussion of an axiom of scale invariance but 
does not pursue the issue and formulate a requirement. 
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assumption that less money for the poor will increase poverty. The axiom of weak 
monotonicity in Zheng’s version asserts:7             
Weak Monotonicity: 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥; 𝑧𝑧) > 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦; 𝑧𝑧) whenever 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 is obtained from 
𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 by a simple decrement to a poor person. 
 
Here, 𝐷𝐷 is the set of income profiles below the poverty line 𝑧𝑧, while 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 are income 
profiles. The decrement reduces the income of one household or person in y and thus leads to 
𝑥𝑥. In such cases, a poverty indicator should strictly increase. Unfortunately, the (here implicit) 
ceteris paribus clause of the axiom prevents a direct application of the monotonicity axiom to 
our case. If the expenditure shares of all other persons remain unchanged, an increase in the 
expenditure share of an energy poor person will raise energy poverty even for the double 
median share indicator. However, if the ceteris paribus clause only holds for income changes 
of poor people,8 the case is less clear-cut. This is not the place to pursue this interpretative 
problem, and we will therefore focus on PIB instead of on weak monotonicity.      
As indicated, standard lines of relative poverty, such as a 60 percent median income poverty 
line, satisfy the requirements of PIB. For poverty lines of the form ‘𝑞𝑞 times median’ it 
depends on the value of 𝑞𝑞 ∈ 𝑅𝑅+ whether PIB is satisfied or not. For 𝑞𝑞 ≤ 1 the requirement is 
satisfied, but not for 𝑞𝑞 > 1. In light of this result, a double median share interpretation of the 
TPR (or any interpretation of 𝑞𝑞 > 1) should be avoided. However, it is compatible with PIB 
and other poverty axioms to retain the TPR as a fixed percentage threshold. Normative 
justifications for a fixed percentage threshold have to, of course, be sought. A suitable 
strategy would be a ‘bottom up’ justification of the TPR, analogous to the calibration of 
thresholds for absolute poverty. Hence, which kind of energy services a household absolutely 
needs and what share of income is required for these services could be assessed. TPR has the 
advantage of naming a simple round number and thus being easily communicable to the 
public. A detailed ‘bottom up’ construction of a fixed percentage threshold would only aid 
policy if the differences in measurement (at least the headcount and depth of energy poverty) 
were large enough to be significant.  
Alternatively, the double median share criterion could be replaced by a different quantile-type 
indicator that satisfies PIB. A respective threshold should for the stated reasons not be 
conceived as a growing multiple of the median. Consequently, such an indicator is probably 
7See Sen (1976). The axiom is presented in Zheng’s formulation (1997, p. 131). 
8 The focus axiom, which asserts that a poverty measurement should be independent of the income distribution 
of the non-poor, seems to suggest this (Zheng, 1997, p. 130 ). 
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best expressed as 𝑟𝑟-times (with 𝑟𝑟 < 1) a higher quartile or decile. Under this premise, 
Boardman’s strategy of coupling the TPR with a quantile-type interpretation in a base year 
can be replicated. That is, it can, for instance, be calculated for which 𝑟𝑟 < 1 the value of 𝑟𝑟-
times the 75 percent quartile expenditure share equals ten percent. Since the quantile is chosen 
to permit 𝑟𝑟 < 1, this threshold would satisfy the requirements of PIB. We will compare this 
new quantile indicator (QI) with the behavior of the double median share indicator. 
Finally, all these expenditure share indicators should be truncated. A high share of energy 
expenditure for high incomes does not imply that the respective households become poor in 
any plausible sense of the term. Inasmuch, Isherwood and Hancock who initiated the interest 
in expenditure share indicators were right to talk about disproportionate energy costs, but not 
of energy (or fuel) poverty proper.9 Since we are interested in energy poverty, higher incomes 
for which high expenditure shares very likely fail to lead to poverty, should be excluded from 
consideration. Hence, we use Boardman’s linkage of the TPR to the lowest three deciles of 
income for a truncation of the TPR and its suggested modifications. In other words, cognates 
of the TPR and quantile-type indicators are only calculated for the bottom three income 
deciles. 
Another prominent indicator of energy poverty is the LIHC indicator proposed by Hills (2012, 
2011). This indicator has replaced the TPR as the official English target value in the fight 
against energy poverty. LIHC has the advantage of more directly representing the idea of 
energy poverty as poverty caused by excessive expenditure for adequate energy services than 
the TPR. However, it is debatable whether the threshold for excessive expenditure should be 
the overall median of energy expenditure. Surely, as Hills argues, low income households 
appear overburdened if they have to spend more than the overall median on energy. Yet this 
does not justify setting the threshold at the median expenditure because households with less 
expenditure might already be overburdened. Moreover, the LIHC indicator is also 
incompatible with plausible demands of poverty measurement. 
It should be possible for wealthy households to become poor by reducing their income 
(ignoring additional wealth for now). Nobody is so rich as to not become poor by being 
deprived of a sufficient amount of money. We call this the ‘impoverishment axiom’: 
Impoverishment (IMP): For all particular incomes 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 > 𝑧𝑧 there is a decrement 𝑑𝑑 > 0 
so that 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑑𝑑 < 𝑧𝑧R and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑑𝑑 ∈ 𝑥𝑥R with 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. 
9See Isherwood and Hancock (1979, part 1:3).  
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It seems plausible that IMP also holds for energy poverty. There should be an amount of 
energy expenditure and income, or share of energy expenditure relative to income, at which 
any person or household becomes energy poor. Certainly, having to spend all income for 
adequate energy services will make a household (ceteris paribus) energy poor. Yet the LIHC 
indicator does not reflect this consideration. A household whose income shrinks so that 
expenditure for adequate energy services finally approaches total income will not be energy 
poor according to the LIHC indicator as long as its energy expenditure remains lower than the 
overall median. Hence, the LIHC indicator will fail to adequately represent energy poverty 
that is caused by an insufficient growth of real incomes (or even shrinking real incomes) 
relative to a significant growth of energy costs – hardly a merely academic possibility. 
The LIHC indicator can be modified to avoid or mitigate this problem. One option we 
investigate is using an expenditure share threshold instead of an expenditure threshold as a 
first condition in the LIHC framework. Independently of this step, a lowering of the LIHC 
median threshold will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of the indicator’s behavior 
under changing circumstances.   
The last indicator to be discussed is MIS. MIS appears closest to a straightforward income 
poverty line approach to poverty. For this reason, MIS possesses none of the axiomatic 
shortcomings of TPR and LIHC. It does not follow, however, that MIS is therefore the only 
indicator deserving serious consideration. We have already signaled that modifications of the 
TPR and LIHC might help circumvent their conceptual shortcomings or interpretations. 
Moreover, MIS shares a disputable characteristic of LIHC: it is insensitive to changes in the 
income share of energy expenditure. Consider two households slightly below the poverty line. 
The income of the first is lower than the other’s. Yet both have the same resulting position 
below the poverty line due to different amounts of adequate energy expenditure. It seems that 
the ex-ante richer household is relatively worse off and relatively poorer than the ex-ante 
poorer household, because it is less able to afford the ordinary lifestyle of its peers (its 
assumed reference group in terms of income). Hence, it may be in order to retain an 
expenditure share indicator such as the TPR to document shifts in expenditure shares, in 
particular for the lower income deciles for which it is not unreasonable to fear that adequate 
energy costs might push them into poverty.  
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2.3. Simulation of Dynamic Behavior: Data and Scenario Description 
2.3.1. Data Description 
Data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) are used to assess finite dynamic 
properties of several energy poverty measures.10 Data on disposable household income after 
taxes and benefits and expenditure on energy (space heating, water heating and electricity) at 
the household level are used for the simulation. Data are available for 8,507 households in 
Germany in 2010. Equivalized income (based on the ‘new’ OECD scale) is calculated to 
obtain a proxy for household income relative to household size (Kohn and Missong, 2003), 
which is needed to obtain some of the affordability measures. SOEP data were previously 
used to assess the incidence of income poverty (BMAS, 2013) and energy poverty in 
Germany (Heindl, 2013). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Data used for the Simulations 
Variable Mean P25 P50 P75 St. Dev. 
Household income 2464 1400 2066 3084 1690 
Equiv. income 1695 1100 1500 2000 1058 
Energy costs 167 113 154 207 79 
Cost share rel. to income 0.0873 0.0497 0.0733 0.1087 0.0571 
No. of persons in household 2.02 1 2 3 1.14 
Overall number of available observations n=8,507, survey year 2010, data source: Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP), data for years 1984-2012, version 29, SOEP, 2014, doi:10.5684/soep.v29. 
 
2.3.2. Scenarios for Simulation and Considered Poverty Measures 
Four scenarios are considered in the simulation of dynamic properties of energy poverty 
measures:  
A) Percentage increase in energy costs for each household: Expenditure on energy 
services is increased in steps of 10%, 20%, …, 100% of initial energy expenditure for 
each individual household. This scenario simulates the case of increasing prices per 
unit of energy. This scenario is similar to a carbon tax levied on energy consumption. 
B) Weighted increase in energy costs for each household: Cost increases are weighted 
in order to be neutral across the deciles of income distribution (i.e. non-regressive) in 
10 Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for the years 1984-2012, version 29, SOEP, 2014, doi:10.5684/soep.v29. 
See Wagner et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the dataset. 
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terms of incidence. Thus, increases in overall costs are lower for low-income vis-à-vis 
high income households. A 1 euro increase in costs in scenario A is equal to a 0.58 
euro increase in costs for a household in the third decile of the income distribution in 
this scenario or a 1.32 euro increase for a household in the seventh decile of the 
income distribution. This scenario simulates the case of a carbon tax with neutral 
incidence. 
C) Percentage decrease of income: Disposable household income is decreased in steps 
of 10%, 20%, …, 100%. This scenario is similar to the case of lost purchasing power 
or a general decrease of household income.    
D) Percentage decrease of income (lowest 30 percent of incomes): Disposable 
household income of the lowest 30 percent of incomes is decreased in steps of 10%, 
20%, …, 100%, while the income of all remaining households and the expenditure on 
energy services remains unchanged. This scenario reflects the case of increased 
income inequality and increased income poverty. 
Different measures of energy poverty are calculated for each scenario. This includes the ten 
percent rule (TPR), the two times median expenditure share indicator (2M), the low 
income/high cost measure (LIHC) and several variations of it, a minimum income standard 
approach (MIS), and the quantile indicator (QI). Table 2 summarizes the technical details of 
the applied measures.  
2.3.3. Evaluation Criteria 
Two criteria, as discussed in Section 2.2, are used to evaluate the simulation results. The first 
criterion is Position Invariant Burdening (PIB). It is related to Sen’s monotonicity axiom 
(Sen, 1976). PIB requires energy poverty measures to increase monotonically as expenditure 
on energy services rises (all other things equal). As changes in energy prices often show 
systematic patterns, PIB is relevant for cases in which overall expenditure on energy services 
changes for all households (or a sufficiently large number of households). In practice, such 
situations could be oil price shocks or changes in energy prices due to taxation.   
The second criterion is Impoverishment (IMP). If the income of all households were 
insufficient to cover the expenses of adequate energy services, it could be said that all 
households are subject to energy poverty. Thus, it is straightforward to expect energy poverty 
measures to increase as the population’s income decreases, all other things equal. This proviso 
must hold for the case when income falls systematically (e.g. as a result of economic shocks 
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causing increased income inequality) and when one household’s income decreases. In other 
words, it must be possible to ‘impoverish’ a household by decreasing its disposable income.  
Table 2: Details on used energy poverty measures 
Measure Method of calculation 
Ten percent measure (TPR) Energy poor if the share of expenditure on energy relative to 
income exceeds ten percent. In the simulation study, the TPR is 
restricted to the poorest 30 percent of households. Households in 
income brackets above 30 percent are excluded by definition. 
Two times median expenditure 
share (2M) 
Energy poor if the expenditure share on energy exceeds two times 
the median expenditure share in the overall population 
Low income high cost standard 
approach (LIHC) 
Energy poor if household has expenditure on energy above the 
median and falls below the income poverty line after expenditure 
on all energy services 
LIHC with TPR as first 
condition (LIHCt) 
Energy poor if households has an expenditure share equal to or 
exceeding ten percent of income and falls below the income 
poverty line after expenditure on all energy services 
LIHC with median expenditure 
of poorest 30 percent of 
households as first condition 
(LIHCm) 
Energy poor if household has expenditure on energy above median 
expenditure of the poorest 30% of incomes and falls below the 
income poverty line after expenditure on all energy services 
Minimum income standard 
(MIS) 
Energy poor if disposable income after expenditure on all energy 
services is equal or less than the minimum income standard (MIS). 
German minimum income under basic social security (SGBII-
rates) are used as MIS (see Heindl, 2013).   
Quantile indicator (QI) Energy poor if the expenditure share exceeds ‘𝑥𝑥-times some upper 
quantile of energy expenditure’ (with 𝑥𝑥 < 1) relative to income. 
For the simulation, the 9th decile of energy expenditure relative to 
income was chosen and multiplied by the parameter 0.86, so to be 
approximately equal to the value of TPR in the original situation. 
Income Poverty (RPL) Energy poor if household falls below the (relative) income poverty 
line (RPL) after all expenditure on energy services. 
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3. Simulation Results 
3.1. Results for Key Measures 
We first focus on the simulation results for the most prominent measures, either already being 
applied in practice or discussed in the literature, namely the ten percent rule (TPR), the two 
times median expenditure share indicator (2M), the ‘standard’ low-income high cost indicator 
(LIHC), and the minimum income standard (MIS). The simulation results are depicted in 
Figure 2.  
3.1.1. Position Invariant Burdening (PIB) 
For the case of a (regressive) percentage increase in energy expenditure (Scenario A), the 
TPR, LIHC, and MIS indicators are responsive and satisfy the requirements of PIB. In 
contrast, the 2M remains unchanged as energy expenditure is increased for all households.  
The case of a non-regressive (weighted) increase of the households’ energy expenditure 
(Scenario B) is of particular interest. In this scenario, increases in energy expenditure are 
weighted so that they satisfy the principle of equal (monetary) sacrifices. The share of 
expenditure on all energy services relative to income is equal for all deciles of the income 
distribution in this scenario. This simulates the case of a progressive carbon tax. In this 
scenario, the TPR and MIS respond to the absolute increase in energy expenditure (given 
constant relative burdens across the income distribution) and satisfy PIB. In contrast, the 2M 
and LIHC decrease, even though expenditure for energy services increases for all households 
in absolute terms. The reason for this counter-intuitive result is that an adjustment of burdens 
changes the distribution of energy costs across households (with wealthier households 
carrying larger absolute burdens), while the relative position of all households in the 
distribution remains unchanged. As both measures define energy poverty based on the median 
of the expenditure distribution, the measures are unable to capture the dynamics of energy 
poverty if there is redistribution in favor of the poor, but not as much as to alter their relative 
positions on the income scale.   
3.1.2. Impoverishment (IMP) 
IMP requires that it must be possible to push a household into energy poverty by decreasing 
its disposable income. For the case of stepwise percentage decreases of all incomes across the 
income distribution (Scenario C), the TPR, the LIHC, and the MIS increase to their maximum 
levels. The 2M remains unchanged when all incomes are decreased. IMP is impossible given 
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the 2M definition because the overall distribution of energy expenditure remains unchanged 
in this scenario. Therefore, the indicator does not change until it collapses, when all incomes 
approach the assumed minimum of 1 euro.11  
A case of particular interest is when income inequality is increased (Scenario D). This is 
modelled by successively decreasing the incomes in the lowest three income brackets while 
leaving the overall expenditure on energy services unchanged. The TPR, the 2M, and the MIS 
respond to the increase in income inequality and the corresponding increase in relative 
burdens of the cost for energy services. In contrast, the LIHC shows a weak response to the 
increase in income inequality. The LIHC slightly increases when the income of the poor 
decreases up to 30 percent, but the indicator remains unchanged when incomes are further 
decreased. Therefore, the LIHC does not satisfy the proviso of IMP. The LIHC’s weak 
response is attributable to the first condition of the measure stating that energy poverty 
depends on the median of energy expenditure in the overall population. Because a household 
will never qualify as energy poor if its expenditure on energy services does not exceed the 
median expenditure, 50 percent of households will not satisfy IMP. This is of particular 
relevance for low-income households in which the average energy expenditure is lower in 
comparison with wealthier households because of positive income elasticities of energy 
demand (Karimu and Brännlund, 2013; Narayan et al., 2007) and possible pre-existing 
deprivation. 
3.2. Results for Alternative Indicators 
Overall, the TPR and MIS satisfy PIB and IMP in all of the considered scenarios. The 2M and 
LIHC violate both propositions in some of the scenarios. Modified versions of the LIHC and 
the 2M are tested for compatibility with PIB and IMP. An alternative to the (fixed) income 
poverty line of the MIS will also be considered. The simulation results for alternative 
measures are depicted in Figure 3. 
 3.2.1. Alternatives to LIHC 
Alternatives to the LIHC pivot around a modified first condition of the measure, i.e. the 
condition of ‘expenditure above median’. As an alternative, the first condition could be 
defined as requiring a household to spend at least 𝑥𝑥 percent of its disposable income on all 
energy services. It is straightforward to include the TPR (or any other expenditure share) as a 
11 The least income was chosen to equal 1 euro to avoid issues of division by zero.  
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first condition here (LIHCt). The LIHCt definition is compatible with PIB and IMP in all of 
the considered scenarios. However, as the LIHCt is stricter than the TPR alone, the overall 
figures on energy poverty are lower for the LIHCt than for TPR alone, except in the case of 
decreased incomes where the LIHCt and TPR approach their maximum of 30 percent (as 
required by IMP). 
Instead of using the median expenditure of the overall sample, the median expenditure of the 
lower three income brackets could be used as a first condition (LIHCm30) to give priority to 
the economic situation of the poor. The rationale for this choice is that low-income 
households are particularly vulnerable to increased prices of necessities. The LIHCm30 
definition is compatible with PIB and IMP in all scenarios with the exception of increased 
inequality of the poor (Scenario D), where it violates both propositions.  
3.2.2. Alternatives to 2M 
As an alternative to 2M, the definition of ‘𝑥𝑥-times some upper quantile of energy expenditure’ 
(with 𝑥𝑥 < 1) relative to income was discussed in Section 2.2 (QI). For the simulation, the 9th 
decile of energy expenditure relative to income was chosen and multiplied by the parameter 
0.86, so as to be approximately equal to the value of the TPR in the original situation. Both 
the parameter and the 9th decile are chosen arbitrarily, as the sole purpose is to test the 
dynamic properties of such a measure. The simulation results show that such a QI measure 
would have similar deficiencies as the 2M definition from a dynamic perspective. The 
indicator violates the PIB and IMP in several situations. 
3.2.3. Alternatives to MIS 
The MIS definition as used in this paper relies on a household-specific absolute income 
poverty line. The income poverty line is chosen to represent allowances under the basic social 
security scheme in Germany (SGBII rates). The absolute income poverty line is treated as 
exogenous in the simulation. A potential alternative to the MIS definition would be to use a 
definition of relative income poverty, such as the widely accepted poverty line of 60 percent 
median income (RPL). The RPL was applied so that it is endogenous and based on 
equivalized household income. A household is defined as energy poor if its disposable income 
falls below the relative income poverty line of 60 percent median income after all expenses 
for energy services. The simulation results show that RPL is compatible with PIB and IMP in 
all but one of the considered scenarios. In the case of increased income inequality, i.e. when 
the income of the lower three income brackets decreases, the RPL remains constant when 
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incomes decrease by more than 40 percent. At first glance, this appears to be a violation of the 
PIB. However, the result hinges on the relative income poverty line. The relative income 
poverty line remains unchanged, as it ought to once the incomes of the lower three income 
brackets approach the minimum value in the simulation. Therefore, a violation of PIB is 
appropriate in the scenario setup in this specific situation.  
4. Discussion 
In general, the TPR, MIS, LIHCt, and RPL satisfy PIB and IMP, whereas the LIHC and 2M 
violate one or both conditions in some scenarios (Table 3). What drives this result? 2M and 
LIHC are defined based on location parameters (the median or values greater than the 
median). 2M and LIHC appear to be sensitive to changes in the moments of the underlying 
distributions. The simulation results support this view.  
A household’s energy expenditure needs to lie above the median and fall below the relative 
income poverty line after all expenditure on energy services to qualify as energy poor 
according to the LIHC. The LIHC is incapable of capturing the incidence of increased 
expenditure in the presence of an ex-post adjustment of energy expenditure (Scenario B) and 
fails to mirror the consequences of increasing inequality in incomes (Scenario D). The first 
aspect is of high relevance with respect to energy and climate policy. If prices for energy 
services increase as consequence of policies for the protection of the climate, and if measures 
are taken to redistribute the burdens of climate policy according to the principle of ‘equal 
sacrifice’, the LIHC will potentially decrease (i.e. indicating an increase in affordability of 
energy services), even though the total cost of energy services increases for all households, all 
other things equal. Redistribution partly offsets energy price increases. Thus, redistribution 
works against the conditions of the LIHC, even if there is an absolute decrease in affordability 
(or an increase in expenditure share). It is important to note that this result is valid for cases in 
which the expenditure distribution is changed so that increased costs are distributed in a 
‘neutral’ or ‘position invariant’ way. This is different from the case of an ex-post 
redistribution of income.  
The LIHC is further unable to capture increased inequality in household incomes: if the 
incomes of households in the lower three deciles of the income distribution are successively 
reduced to eventually equal 1 euro per month, the LIHC increases marginally. Rising 
inequality is independent of the condition ‘expenditure above median’, which causes the 
moderate response of the LIHC to increased inequality. 
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Similar problems occur for the 2M definition: a household is defined as energy poor if its 
expenditure share on energy services exceeds two times the median expenditure share of the 
overall population. The 2M measure fails to capture systematic increases in expenditure, 
because 2M becomes increasingly restrictive as the overall population’s expenditure on 
energy services increases. This causes the decrease of the 2M measure in Scenario B. 2M is 
further unable to capture a systematic increase of expenditure or a systematic decrease of 
incomes, as this causes a likewise systematic change in the expenditure shares and thus leaves 
the 2M condition unchanged in Scenario A and Scenario C.12  
These results are of relevance for alternative definitions of affordability measures. The LIHC 
can be modified to include the TPR as a first condition (LIHCt) instead of the condition 
‘expenditure above median’. The LIHCt satisfies the PIB and IMP. As depicted in Figure 3, 
the LIHCt is responsive to regressive and non-regressive increases in expenditure, to 
decreasing incomes, and to an increase in inequality. This observation supports the view that 
the condition ‘expenditure above median’ in the original version of the LIHC causes 
unintuitive dynamic behavior in Scenarios B and D.  
It is important to note that the results of this paper focus exclusively on fundamental dynamic 
properties of affordability measures but have no direct implications for the ‘static’ definition 
of affordability measures. As depicted in Figures 2 and 3, the response of the different 
measures to changes in the underlying variables differs. Some measures (e.g. the TPR) show 
quite pronounced responses while others (e.g. the MIS) only show moderate reaction. It is an 
empirical question how strongly an affordability measure needs to respond to changes in 
underlying variables in order to capture the changes in affordability or deprivation. This 
question, which is left for future research, needs to be answered for specific cases or types of 
goods and be based on empirical evidence. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper investigates the dynamic behavior of energy affordability measures. Measures of 
affordability are used in practice or are proposed as policy instruments to assess the 
affordability of goods such as energy services, water, and housing. Affordability measures, by 
definition, are based on income and expenditure for specific goods, and thus define a poverty 
line based on multiple criteria and ‘tacit weighting’ (Alkire and Foster, 2011). While well-
12 In some cases, the 2M even decreased, e.g. in the case of a lump-sum increase in energy expenditure across 
income distribution. 
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established axioms on the dynamics of aggregated poverty measures based on a single 
criterion exist, no such criteria are available for affordability measures. Measures of 
affordability comprise normative statements about how non-affordability is defined, as is the 
case for virtually all definitions of deprivation. With respect to these normative statements, 
two domains can be distinguished. Firstly, how affordability is defined at one point in time, 
and secondly, how affordability changes over time as a result of changes in underlying key 
variables. The latter aspect, i.e. the ‘dynamics’ of affordability measures, has so far received 
virtually no attention in the literature. 
Two propositions are made about how affordability measures should respond to changes in 
underlying key variables: Position Invariant Burdening (PIB) is motivated by a standard 
axiom in poverty measurement, namely monotonicity (Sen, 1976). PIB requires that a 
measure of non-affordability increases if the actual expenditure on the respective goods 
increases in society without a change in individual positions. Impoverishment (IMP) requires 
that it must be possible to push a household below the poverty line by decreasing the 
household’s income below a certain threshold.  
Based on a microsimulation approach, dynamic behavior of a number of affordability 
measures is examined. This includes the ‘ten percent rule’ (TPR), the ‘low income/high cost 
measure’ (LIHC), and the ‘two times median expenditure share’ (2M), which have been 
applied to assess fuel poverty in the UK (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013; 
Hills, 2012; Liddell et al., 2012; Moore, 2012). Alternative definitions rely on an absolute 
poverty line in the sense of a ‘minimum income standard’ (MIS) (Bradshaw et al., 2008; 
Saunders, 2004, 1999) or on a relative income poverty line (PRL). Modifications of the LIHC 
measure (LIHCt, LIHCm30) and the 2M measure (QI) are examined as well.   
In general, the TPR, MIS, RPL, and LIHCt satisfy the PIB and IMP, while 2M, LIHC, 
LIHCm and QI do not satisfy the PIB and IMP. 2M is fully unable to capture an increase in 
economy-wide energy expenditure or a decrease of incomes. The LIHC fails to capture an 
increase in economy-wide energy expenditure with ex-post redistribution (neutral distribution 
of relative burdens across income brackets). Even though energy expenditure and relative 
burdens increase in all income brackets in this scenario, the LIHC does not indicate a decrease 
in energy affordability. This property of the LIHC is particularly problematic, as 
redistribution takes place in most advanced economies and the LIHC fails to provide robust 
information about (dynamic) energy affordability in this situation. The LIHC is further unable 
to capture the consequences of increased income inequality on energy affordability. In the 
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case of increased income inequality, the LIHC is non-responsive, even though energy 
affordability for poorer households decreases dramatically in this scenario. Alternative 
measures such as QI or LIHCm exhibit similar flaws. The TPR, the MIS, and the RPL have 
desirable properties from a dynamic perspective. The LIHCt seems to be a good combination 
of the TPR and MIS. It is also the only acceptable indicator in our test that reflects two 
different considerations of affordability (i.e., it is the only remaining indicator on a side of the 
indicator triangle). All remaining indicators are responsive to changes in energy expenditure 
and income of households in all scenarios. The results have important implications in 
practice: measures following the logic of the 2M or LIHC definition potentially exhibit 
dynamic inconsistencies while measures following the logic of the TPR, MIS, RPL, or LIHCt 
appear more appropriate from a dynamic perspective.  
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Figure 2: Dynamic behavior of energy affordability measures under Scenarios A to D.
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Figure 3: Dynamic behavior of alternative energy affordability measures under Scenarios A to D.
 Table 3: Summary of dynamic properties of energy poverty measures 
 TPR 2M LIHC LIHCt LIHCm30 MIS RPL QI 
Scenario A: Percentage increase of individual energy expenditure 
Position invariant burdening         
Scenario B: Neutral increase of energy expenditure (with same revenue as in scenario A) 
Position invariant burdening         
Scenario C: Decrease of individual income 
Position invariant burdening         
Impoverishment         
Scenario D: Decrease of income in lower three income brackets (increased income inequality) 
Position invariant burdening         
Impoverishment         
Overall         
 
